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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the identification problem in infinite horizon Markovian games and proposes a
generally applicable estimation method. Every period firms simultaneously select an action from a
finite set. We characterize the set of Markov equilibria. Period profits are a linear function of
equilibrium choice probabilities. The question of identification of these values is then reduced to the
existence of a solution to this linear equation system. We characterize the identification conditions.
We propose a simple estimation procedure which follows the steps in the identification argument.
The estimator is consistent, asymptotic normally distributed, and efficient.
We have collected quarterly time series data on pubs, restaurants, coffeehouses, bakeries and
carpenters for two Austrian towns between 1982 and 2002. A dynamic entry game is estimated in
which firms simultaneously decide whether to enter, remain active, or exit the industry. The period
profit estimates are used to simulate the equilibrium behavior under a policy experiment in which
a unit tax is imposed on firms deciding to enter the industry.
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m.pesendorfer@lse.ac.uk1I n t r o d u c t i o n
After the seminal papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990, 1991), equilibrium conditions of static
games with binary actions have become a basic estimation tool in empirical industrial organization.
The technique makes possible the inference of proﬁt values and entry costs based on the number of
active ﬁrms in the industry. Static entry models have been analyzed in a number of recent papers
including Berry (1992), Davis (1999), Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2001) and Tamer (2003). See Reiss
(1996) and Berry and Reiss (2002) for surveys of the literature. A shortcoming of this literature is
that dynamic considerations are left aside and a static view of the world is adopted.
This paper studies the identiﬁcation problem of inﬁnite horizon Markovian games and proposes
a generally applicable estimation method for dynamic games. Every period each ﬁrm privately
observes a proﬁtability shock drawn from a known distribution function. Firms simultaneously
choose an action from a ﬁnite set. In our application, the ﬁrms decide whether to enter, to remain
active, or to exit the industry. The dynamic game permits decisions to be a function of observable
state variables. Firms make forward looking decisions taking into account the eﬀect of future entry
and demand on future proﬁts. The dynamic formulation has at least three advantages over the static
model commonly used in the literature: (i) it allows distinct period payoﬀs as a function of state
variables; (ii) contemporaneous demand and state variables determine whether entry takes place;
and (iii) explicit information in the timing of actions is exploited. The increased richness of our
model permits us to infer a larger set of parameters.
The main contribution of the paper is twofold: First, we show new identiﬁcation results for
dynamic games. We characterize conditions under which the period payoﬀsc a nb ei d e n t i ﬁed. The
identiﬁcation arguments are based on a suﬃciently rich time-series data on observed choices.
Second, we propose a computationally simple estimation method generally applicable for dynamic
games. The estimation method is similar to Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2002) but considers ﬁnite
action games instead of continuous choice games. The choice probabilities are estimated using
maximum likelihood. The period payoﬀs are inferred by using the equilibrium conditions of the
dynamic game. The estimator is consistent, asymptotic normally distributed, and eﬃcient.
The main idea behind this paper stems from the following observation: In ﬁnite action games
with private information, there exists a type that is exactly indiﬀerent between two alternative
actions. For this type, the continuation value of one action must equal the continuation value of
the alternative action. The indiﬀerent type condition is satisﬁed at every state vector yielding
an equation system with as many equations as there are states. The equation system stemming
from the indiﬀerence conditions permits us to adopt a similar estimation technique as to that in
2continuous choice dynamic games. The indiﬀerent type is not observed but can be inferred from the
observed choices. Further, for each state variable, the indiﬀerence condition is a linear equation in
period proﬁts. This follows from the fact that the value function is linear in period payoﬀs. The
linearity substantially simpliﬁes the identiﬁcation and estimation problem. Based on the linearity,
we can express the parameters of the model as an explicit function of the choice probabilities. The
identiﬁcation question is then reduced to the existence of a unique solution to the linear equation
system. In addition, the set of indiﬀerence conditions enables us to numerically calculate Markov
equilibria of ﬁnite action games in a simple way.
We apply the proposed method to data consisting of quarterly time series observations regarding
the identity of active ﬁrms in a number of industries for two Austrian cities between 1982 and 2002.
In addition, we use gross domestic product time series data. The estimation proceeds as follows:
First, a probit model is estimated. The dependent variable is an indicator variable whether the
ﬁrm is active in a period. The explanatory variables are the state variables including an indicator
of whether the ﬁrm was active in the preceding period, the number of other active ﬁrms in the
preceding period, the level of gross domestic product, and interaction terms between these variables.
We assume that gross domestic product evolves deterministically. We then construct the transition
probability matrix of state variables using the probit estimates.
We infer the period proﬁt values based on the equilibrium condition for the indiﬀerent type. We
illustrate the simplicity of the estimation approach, discuss the goodness of ﬁt of our estimates, and
assess properties of the equilibrium. Finally, we conduct a policy experiment in which a unit tax is
imposed on ﬁrms deciding to enter the industry.
There is a small empirical literature on dynamic games including Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002),
Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000, 2002) and Pakes and Berry (2002). Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2002) consider a two-stage estimation approach for dynamic games with ﬁnite actions. They show
that, after substituting the ﬁrst stage choice probabilities and obtaining an expression for the value
function, the optimality conditions of the discrete game can be written as inequalities in the pa-
rameters of the model. In the second stage, Aguirregabiria and Mira propose a pseudo maximum
likelihood estimator in which the likelihood deﬁned by those inequalities is maximized. Simulation is
used in the second stage to reduce the computational complexity of the estimator. Pakes and Berry
(2002) propose two estimators for dynamic entry games: A nested ﬁxed point estimator similar to
Rust (1994), and a two stage estimator in which a pseudo likelihood is estimated in the second
stage, similarly to Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002). In contrast to these approaches, the estimator
proposed in this paper dispenses entirely with the second stage maximum likelihood estimation, or
nested ﬁxed point estimation. Instead, an eﬃcient and computationally simple estimator is proposed
3by expressing the parameters of the model as an explicit function of the choice probabilities.
Our model formulation and estimation approach is most closely related to Jofre-Bonet and Pe-
sendorfer (2000, 2002). Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer consider an inﬁnite horizon Markovian bidding
game with idiosyncratic cost shocks under the presence of capacity constraints. Estimation proceeds
in two stages: In the ﬁrst stage, the choice probabilities are estimated using the observed bid data.
In the second stage, the costs are inferred based on the ﬁrst order condition of optimally chosen
bids. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000, 2002) show that the ﬁrst order condition of the dynamic
game is a linear equation in unknown costs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the dynamic game with a ﬁnite action
space. Section 3 characterizes properties of the equilibrium. Section 4 presents the identiﬁcation
results. Section 5 proposes the estimator. Section 6 describes the data and gives some descriptive
statistics. Section 7 reports the estimation results. Section 8 ilustrates the long run payoﬀsa n d
assesses a policy experiment in which a unit tax is imposed on ﬁrms deciding to enter. Section 9
concludes.
2M o d e l
This section describes the elements of the model. We describe the sequencing of events, the period
game, the transition function, the payoﬀs, the strategies and the equilibrium concept.
We consider a dynamic game with discrete time, t =1 ,2...,∞.T h es e to fﬁrms is denoted by
N = {1,...,N} and a typical ﬁrm is denoted by i ∈ N.T h en u m b e ro fﬁrms is ﬁxed and does not
change over time. Every period the following events take place:
A state vector is publicly observed. Each ﬁrm is endowed with a state variable st
i ∈ Si =
{1,...,L}. The vector of all ﬁrms’ state variables is denoted by st =( st
1,...,s t
N) ∈ S = ×N
j=1Sj.









∈ S−i to denote the vector of
states by ﬁrms other than ﬁrm i. The cardinality of the state space S equals ms = LN.








<K. The shock is not observed by other ﬁrms. The shock εtk
i is drawn independently from the strict
monotone and continuous distribution function F. Independence of εt
i from the state variables is
an important assumption, since it allows us to adopt the Markov dynamic decision framework. For







exists for all ε, to ensure that the expected period return exists.
Actions: Each ﬁrm decides which action to take, at
i ∈ Ai = {0,1,...,K}.A l lN ﬁrms, including
ﬁrms not active in the last period, make their decisions simultaneously. The actions are taken after
4ﬁrms observe the state and their idiosyncratic productivity shock. An action proﬁle at denotes the
vector of joint actions in period t, at =( at
1,...,a t
N) ∈ A = ×N
j=1Aj. The cardinality of the action
space A equals ma =( K +1 )
N.
The transition of the state variables is described by a probability density function g : A×S×S −→
[0,1] where a typical element g
¡
at,s t,s t+1¢
equals the probability that state st+1 is reached when




(a,s) ∈ A×S.W ef r e q u e n t l yu s et h es y m b o lG to denote the (ma · ms)×ms dimensional transition
matrix in which column s
0







The period payoﬀ of ﬁrm i is collected at the end of the period after all actions are observed.
The period payoﬀ of ﬁrm i consists of the proﬁt realization and the proﬁtability shock realization.










where 1a equals one if event a occurs and zero otherwise; the proﬁt π depends on the action proﬁle
of ﬁr m sa n dt h es t a t ev e c t o r . W ea s s u m et h a tp r o ﬁts are bounded, |πi (.)| < ∞ for all i.W e





.T h e p r o ﬁtability shock aﬀects actions k>0 only. The assumption
that action 0 is not aﬀected by the proﬁtability shock is not restrictive as only the payoﬀ diﬀerence
between alternative actions matters.
Firms discount future payoﬀsw i t ht h ec o m m o nd i s c o u n tf a c t o rβ < 1. The game payoﬀ of ﬁrm
i equals the sum of discounted period payoﬀs.
Following Maskin and Tirole (1994, 2001), we consider sequential equilibria in Markovian strate-
gies ai(εt
i;st).A s t r a t e g y f o r ﬁrm i is a function of the ﬁrm speciﬁcp r o ﬁtability shock and the
state variables. The assumption that the proﬁtability shock is independently distributed allows us
to write the probability of observing action proﬁle at as Pr(at|st)=P r ( at
1|st)···Pr(at
N|st).T h e
Markovian assumption allows us to abstract from calendar time and subsequently we omit the time
superscript.
Symmetry: We are sometimes interested in symmetric payoﬀs and strategies. Symmetry requires
identical payoﬀ vectors, Πi = Π for all i, and identical strategies for all i. Asymmetries between ﬁrms
are then captured in the state variables only. The symmetry assumption reduces the dimensionality
of the problem, which can simplify calculations.
The discounted sum of future payoﬀs for ﬁrm i consists of two elements: The period proﬁta n d
5the proﬁtability shock. In value function notation, the discounted sum is given by:
















where Pr(a−i|s) denotes the conditional probability that ﬁrms −i choose an action proﬁle a−i con-
ditional on state s,a n dEε denotes the expectation operator with respect to the ﬁrm speciﬁcp r o -
ductivity shock. The ﬁniteness of the action and the state spaces guarantees the existence of the
value function Wi, see Rust (1994).
Ex ante value function: We use the ex-ante value function, which is deﬁned as the value function
in expression (1) before ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks are observed and actions are taken, Vi (s)=EεWi (s,ε).


















i |ai = k
¤
· Pr(ai = k|s) (2)
Equation (2) is satisﬁed at every state vector s ∈ S. Since the state space is ﬁnite, we can express
it as a matrix equation:
Vi = PΠi + Di + βPGVi,
where P is the ms × (ma · ms) dimensional matrix consisting of choice probability Pr(a|s) in row




6= s; Di =[ Di (s)]s∈S is the ms × 1





i |ai = k
¤
·
Pr(ai = k|s); Vi =[ Vi (s)]s∈S is the ms ×1 dimensional vector of expected discounted sum of future
payoﬀs; and G denotes the (ma · ms) × ms dimensional transition matrix deﬁned above. Notice
that this matrix equation is a recursive equation in Vi.L e tIs denote the ms dimensional identity
matrix. By the dominant diagonal property, the matrix [Is − βPG] is invertible. We can rewrite
the recursive equation to obtain an explicit expression for Vi:
Vi =[ Is − βPG]
−1 [PΠi + Di]. (3)
Equation (3) provides an expression for the equilibrium ex ante value function. The terms on the
right hand side are the discount factor, the equilibrium choice probability matrix, the state transition
matrix, the period return function, and the equilibrium expected proﬁtability shocks.
Notice, that the value function is a linear function in the period payoﬀs. The linearity property
will help us examine the properties of the equilibrium choices in the next section.
63 Equilibrium Characterization
This section characterizes properties of the dynamic equilibrium. It studies properties of the equi-
librium decision rule, the equilibrium discounted sum of payoﬀs and the equilibrium choice proba-
bilities. We show that the equilibrium decision rule is characterized by an ms · K equation system.
We conclude the section with remarks on the existence and multiplicity of equilibria.
We begin the analysis with a characterization of the equilibrium decision rule. The following
Proposition states a property of equilibrium strategies:
























i (s) for all k.
(4)
All proofs are given in the appendix. Proposition 1 establishes that the equilibrium decision on
whether to adopt action k or not is monotone in the proﬁtability shock εk
i .
The statement in the Proposition is readily illustrated for an action pair (k,0) for a typical ﬁrm
i. It says that, for any state vector, there exists a type εk that is indiﬀerent between actions k and
0. The monotonicity property follows from the assumption that the payoﬀ function is additive in
the private proﬁtability shock εk.I ft h e r ee x i s t sap o i n tεk such that a ﬁrm of type εk is indiﬀerent
between actions k and 0, then any type with a smaller proﬁtability shock, εk < εk, will prefer action
0. On the other hand, any type with a higher proﬁtability shock, εk > εk, will prefer action k.T h e
reason is that the current period payoﬀ for an active ﬁrm is additive in εk, while the future payoﬀs
and the current period payoﬀ for a ﬁrm choosing action 0 are unaﬀected by εk.T h ep o i n tεk exists,
since the support of εk is unbounded, while the period return Π, and the value function are bounded.
Indiﬀerence equation: The indiﬀerent type εk
i receives the same expected discounted sum of

































Equation (5) is a necessary equilibrium condition that must be satisﬁed at every state s ∈ S and
for every action k =1 ,...,K yielding a total of ms · K equations with ms · K indiﬀerent types,






s∈S,k=1,...K be the (ms · K) × 1 dimensional vector of indiﬀerent types; let P−i be
the ms × ((K +1 )
N−1 · ms) dimensional matrix consisting of choice probability Pr(a−i|s) in row s




6= s;a n dd e ﬁne the (ms · K)×(ma · ms)
dimensional matrix Pi (ε) as:
ai =
01 2 ... K
Pi (ε)=
z }| { 
     

−P−i P−i 0 ... 0
−P−i 0 P−i ... 0
. . . 00
... 0
−P−i 00 ... P −i

     

We can re-state equation (5) as:
Pi (ε)Πi + βPi (ε)GVi + εi =0 (6)
Substituting equation (3) into equation (6), leads us to the following result:
Proposition 2 In any Markov equilibrium for all i ∈ N there exists εi such that:
h
Pi (ε)+βPi (ε)G[Is − βP (ε)G]
−1 P (ε)
i
Πi + βPi (ε)G[Is − βP (ε)G]
−1 Di (ε)+εi =0 . (7)
Conversely, any ε =( ε1,...,εN) that satisﬁes equation (7) c a nb ee x t e n d e dt oaM a r k o ve q u i l i b r i u m .
The above Proposition characterizes the set of equilibria. It provides a necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for any Markov equilibrium. It gives a system of ms · K · N indiﬀerence equations
characterizing the ms · K · N equilibrium indiﬀerence points ε. The necessity part stems from the
indiﬀerence condition which says that, for the indiﬀerent type, the continuation value when taking
action k is exactly equal to the continuation value when taking action 0.T h e s u ﬃciency part in
the Proposition is established by showing that any ε that satisﬁes equation (7) can be extended to
construct a decision rule that constitutes a Markov equilibrium.
Equation (7) in Proposition 2 is a linear equation in the parameter Πi. The linearity property
will play a central role in the identiﬁcation and estimation section.
Next, we provide a few remarks on the existence, computation and multiplicity of equilibria. The
following theorem establishes that an equilibrium exists.
Theorem 1 A Markov equilibrium exists.
8The theorem follows from Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem. Equation (7) gives us a continuous
function from a bounded subset of <ms·K·N onto itself. By Brouwer’s theorem it has a ﬁxed point
ε.
Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 enable us to calculate equilibria numerically. They show that the
equilibrium calculation is reduced to a ﬁxed point problem in <ms·K·N, which is solvable even for
non-trivial ms, K and N. Backwards solving algorithms, which calculate a new optimal policy and
value function at each step of the iteration, are computationally complex, as is shown in Pakes
and McGuire (2001). Proposition 2 shows that the space of indiﬀerent types gives an equivalent
representation of equilibria which facilitates the computation considerably. Hence, it is not needed
to determine the optimal decision rule and value function at every step of the iteration.
A remaining issue is whether the equilibrium is unique or not. The following example illustrates
that more than one equilibrium can exist.
Multiplicity of Equilibria: Suppose the industry consists of two ﬁrms. States and actions are
binary. Period proﬁts do not depend on state variables. Monopoly proﬁts equal 3
2 and duopoly proﬁts
equal −3
2. The proﬁtability shock is drawn from a standard normal distribution function. Firms
decide whether to be active or inactive. Then, there exist multiple equilibria. We describe three
symmetric equilibria. Two equilibria have the following feature along the equilibrium path: Only
one ﬁrm is active in any period with high probability. This arises due to the positive monopoly and
negative duopoly payoﬀs. In the ﬁrst equilibrium the identity of the active ﬁrm changes every period.
The active ﬁrm becomes inactive and the inactive ﬁrm becomes active. In the second equilibrium, the
active ﬁrm remains active and the inactive ﬁrm remains inactive. The third equilibrium diﬀers. On
its path, each ﬁrm has a ﬁfty percent chance of being active.1 The equilibria are robust to parameter
perturbations. Proﬁt values with distinct values for diﬀerent states - but small diﬀerences in the
state dimension - and a positive but small discount factor yield equilibria with the same qualitative
equilibrium behavior.
Symmetry: We conclude the section with a discussion of the symmetry assumption which is
assumed in the empirical section. Symmetry requires identical payoﬀ vectors Πi = Π and identi-
cal decision rules. It can be veriﬁed that the above arguments remain valid under the symmetry
restriction which leads us to the following Corollary:
1The equilibrium strategies are the following: (i) a(1,1,ε)=a(0,0,ε)=1if and only if ε > 0, a(1,0,ε)=1if
and only if ε > 1.08,a n da(0,1,ε)=1if and only if ε > −1.08
(ii) a(1,1,ε)=a(0,0,ε)=1if and only if ε > 0, a(1,0,ε)=1if and only if ε > −1.08,a n da(0,1,ε)=1if and
only if ε > 1.08
(iii) a(1,1,ε)=a(0,0,ε)=1if and only if ε > 0, a(1,0,ε)=1if and only if ε > 0,a n da(0,1,ε)=1if and only
if ε > 0.
9Corollary 1 Suppose Πi = Π.
(i) A symmetric Markov equilibrium exists.
(ii) For any symmetric Markov equilibrium there exists an ε1 such that ε =( ε1,...,ε1) satisﬁes
h
P1 (ε)+βP1 (ε)G[Is − βP (ε)G]
−1 P (ε)
i
Π + βP1 (ε)G[Is − βP (ε)G]
−1 D(ε1)+ε1 =0 . (8)
Conversely, any ε =( ε1,...,ε1) that satisﬁes equation (8) c a nb ee x t e n d e dt oas y m m e t r i cM a r k o v
equilibrium.
The symmetry assumption reduces the number of equations in (7). The reduction in dimension
reduces the complexity of the problem which may facilitate the numerical calculation of equilibria.
Additionally, symmetry places a number of restrictions on the payoﬀ vector Π which can be useful
in the empirical analysis.
So far we have characterized several qualitative features of the equilibrium. In addition, we
provided a simple characterization of the equilibrium choice probabilities in form of an equation
system that can be solved numerically. Finally, we illustrated that the analysis remains valid under
the symmetry restriction. Next, we use the necessary and suﬃcient equilibrium condition (7) which
is a linear equation in period payoﬀs to address the question of identiﬁcation.
4I d e n t i ﬁcation
This section studies identiﬁcation conditions of the underlying model parameters which are the
distribution of proﬁtability shocks F, the discount factor β,a n dt h ep e r i o dp r o ﬁtv e c t o rΠ.W e
provide conditions that allow us to ﬁnd a unique set of parameters that rationalizes the observed
choices. We conclude the section with a discussion of the identifying conditions in symmetric entry
models. These conditions are imposed in our empirical application.
We assume that a time-series sample of choic e sa n ds t a t e si sa v a i l a b l e .T h es a m p l ei ss u ﬃciently
large to characterize the equilibrium choice probabilities.
Assumption 1: We observe data (at,s t)
T
t=1 which permit us to characterize the choice proba-
bilities Pr(a|s) and the transition probabilities g(a,s,s
0
) for any s,s
0
∈ S,a ∈ A.
Notice that we consider a time-series data set from one industry at a time. Hence, the choice
probabilities characterize a single equilibrium.2
The potential number of ﬁrms may not be known in some applications. This may arise if ﬁrms
are not observed when inactive. Yet, if there is at least one action in which the ﬁrm is observed,
2Identiﬁcation of static entry models based on a cross-section data set is considered in Tamer (2003).
10then the potential number of ﬁr m si si d e n t i ﬁed. To see this, notice that every period every ﬁrm has
a positive probability of selecting any action. This probability is bounded away from zero. Thus,
eventually, all potential ﬁrms are observed. The potential number of ﬁr m se q u a l st h em a x i m u m
number of observed ﬁrms.
The vector of indiﬀerent types ε is not known. Proposition 1 gives a relationship between the
vector of indiﬀerent types and the equilibrium actions. If the distribution F is known, then the
relationship in Proposition 1 gives an equation characterizing choice probabilities in terms of the
vector of indiﬀerent types. The following Lemma states that the equation has a unique solution.
The Lemma is due to Hotz and Miller (1993).
Lemma 1 Suppose F is known. Suppose there exists a δ > 0 such that Pr(ai = k|s) > δ for all
i ∈ N,k ∈ Ai,s∈ S. Then for all i ∈ N, s ∈ S there exists a unique vector εi (s) that solves the
following K equations, one for every action k =1 ,...,K, given by:















The Lemma states that the indiﬀerent types can be uniquely recovered from the choice proba-
bilities provided F is known. The Lemma is easily illustrated for binary action spaces. With binary
actions equation (9)can be re-written to obtain a unique and explicit expression for the indiﬀerent
type given by:
ε1
i (s)=F−1(Pr(ai =0 |s)).
With the indiﬀerent types recovered, we can infer the vector of ex ante expected proﬁtability shocks














With the choice probabilities, the transition probabilities and indiﬀerent types at hand, all the coef-
ﬁcients entering equation (7) are known. Since equation (7) is a necessary and suﬃcient equilibrium
condition, it can be used to infer period payoﬀs. Next, we discuss in some detail what conditions
are required to make this inference possible.
The following Proposition provides a negative identiﬁcation result.
Proposition 3 (i) The parameters (F,β,Π1,...,ΠN) are not identiﬁed.
(ii) For given F, the parameters (β,Π1,...,ΠN) are not identiﬁed.
(iii) For given (F,β), the parameters (Π1,...,ΠN) are not identiﬁed.
11The Proposition says that the model is not identiﬁed. The non-identiﬁcation result is similar in
spirit to results obtained in the single agent dynamics literature, see Rust (1994) and Magnac and
Thesmar (2002). Part (i) says that in the absence of the knowledge of the distribution function F,
the vector ε is not determined. Hence, none of the elements in equation (7) are known and the model
is clearly not identiﬁed. The non-identiﬁcation of the distribution function F is closely related to
the assumption of a ﬁnite action space. When the action space is an interval and the proﬁt function
is known, then F can be identiﬁed, as is shown in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2002). A parametric
assumption on the distribution function F is not enough, as can be seen from equation (7).A s s u m i n g
that proﬁtability shocks are normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ amounts
to re-scaling the matrix Π by the standard deviation σ. Hence, the standard deviation σ is not
identiﬁed.
Parts (ii) and (iii) take the distribution function F as given. They show that the model’s
remaining parameters are not identiﬁed. The reason is that equation (7) has K · LN · N equations
while the parameter vector has (K +1 )
N ·LN ·N +1elements. Hence, even if in addition to F the
parameter β is ﬁxed, the remaining parameters are not identiﬁed.
Proposition 3 establishes the need to impose identifying restrictions. We proceed by ﬁxing the
distribution function F and the discount parameter β and discussing the identifying restrictions on
the proﬁt vector. In our application, we assume F is the standard normal distribution function.
Recall that equation (7) is linear in the proﬁt parameter vector Πi. With a known distribution
function F and a given discount parameter β, the question of identiﬁcation of Πi is then reduced
to the question of the existence of a unique solution to the linear equation system. In economic
applications it can be veriﬁed whether the restrictions of the model yield a unique solution. We next
discuss some restrictions for the single agent and multi agent case that guarantee identiﬁcation.
In the single agent case, for a ﬁxed discount parameter β, the rank of the matrix premultiplying
the proﬁt parameter vector in equation (7) is at most K · L as there are K · L equations. At least
L restrictions on proﬁts are required as the proﬁt parameter vector has (K +1 )· L parameters. In
economic applications it is assumed that the proﬁt value for one action, say action zero, is ﬁxed
exogenously for every state, see Magnac and Thesmar (2002).
In the multi agent case, for a ﬁxed discount parameter β and for every ﬁrm i, the rank of the
matrix premultiplying the proﬁt parameter vector Πi in equation (7) is at most K · LN as there
are K · LN equations. The proﬁt parameter vector Πi has (K +1 )






· LN restrictions on proﬁts are required for every ﬁrm. We next state two
restrictions for the multi agent case. We impose these restrictions in the estimation.
12Restriction (R1) says that period proﬁts do not depend on the state variables of other ﬁrms:
πi (ai,a −i,s i,s −i)=πi(ai,a −i,s i) for all a ∈ A,s ∈ S (R1)
for some ((K +1 )
N ·L)×1 dimensional vector Πi =[ πi (ai,a −i,s i)](ai,a−i,si)∈Ai×A−i×Si.R e s t r i c t i o n
(R1) ﬁxes (K +1 )
N · (LN − L) proﬁt parameters. Restriction (R1) is satisﬁed in games with
adjustment costs such as entry or investment games.
Restriction (R2) says that period proﬁts under action ai =0are ﬁxed exogenously for every
state si a n da c t i o np r o ﬁle a−i:
πi(0,a −i,s i)=bi(a−i,s i) for all a−i ∈ A−i,s i ∈ Si (R2)
for some ((K +1 )
N−1·L)×1 dimensional exogenous vector bi.R e s t r i c t i o n(R2) ﬁxes (K +1 )
N−1·L
proﬁt parameters. Restriction (R2) is satisﬁed in games in which one action, say action inactivity,
implies zero proﬁts.
Restrictions (R1) and (R2) can be imposed in equation (7).L e tXi denote the restricted matrix
of dimension (K·LN)×(K·(K +1 )
N−1·L) which is obtained by summing columns in the unrestricted
matrix Xi = Pi + βPiG[Is − βPG]
−1 P in equation (7) which are associated with identical proﬁt
values πi(ai,a −i,s i) for ai > 0. Using this notation, the restricted equation (7) c a nb es t a t e da s :
Xi · Πi + Zi =0 . (10)
where , Zi = βPiG[Is − βPG]
−1 Di +Xb
i ·bi +εi and Xb
i denotes a matrix of dimension (K ·LN)×
((K +1 )
N−1 · L) which is obtained by summing columns in the unrestricted matrix Xi which are
associated with proﬁtv a l u e sbi(a−i,s i) for ai =0 . The following Proposition states the identiﬁcation
result.
Proposition 4 Suppose F and β are given, and restrictions (R1) and (R2) are satisﬁed.





(ii) If L ≥ K +1 , and if the restricted matrix Xi has full column rank, then the parameter vector
Πi is identiﬁed.
The Proposition states that the identiﬁcation of the proﬁt parameters depends on the dimen-
sionality of the state and action spaces. Part (i) says that if there are fewer states than actions,
then the model is not identiﬁed. Part (ii) says that provided the number of states equals at least the
number of actions, and the restricted matrix Xi has full column rank, then the proﬁt parameters
are identiﬁed.
13Observe that restriction (R2) in Proposition 4 is required. The intuitive reasons is that the
indiﬀerence analysis determines payoﬀsr e l a t i v et ot h ep a y o ﬀ under action ai =0at every state
only. The formal reasons is that the matrix Xi consists of a product of matrices, Xi = Pi·[Ims·ma +
βG[Is − βPG]








dimensional matrix Pi given by:
ai =
01 2 ... K
Pi =
z }| { 
     

−P−i P−i 0 ... 0
−P−i 0 P−i ... 0
. . . 00
... 0
−P−i 00 ... P −i

     

The ﬁrst column in the matrix Pi, which is associated with action ai =0 , is collinear with the
remaining columns in the matrix Pi requiring that payoﬀs associated with one action for every state
are exogenously ﬁxed.
Part (ii) in Proposition 4 requires that the matrix Xi has full column rank K · (K +1 )
N−1 · L.
This condition is required as the rank condition may fail. Recall our earlier example illustrating the
multiplicity of equilibria. In the ﬁrst two equilibria the rank of the matrix Xi equals 4 while in the
third equilibrium the rank equals 2 only.
Next, we brieﬂy discuss symmetric games with binary actions (and states). We describe the
assumptions and the set of identifying restrictions in this case in more detail, as we will take this
speciﬁcation to our data.
Identiﬁcation in Symmetric Entry Games
This section describes a set of identifying assumptions for symmetric entry models. We impose
these assumptions in the empirical analysis.
The action space of ﬁrm i is binary, K =1 .A c t i o n 1 denotes a ﬁrm that remains active, or
enters the market. Action 0 represents an exiting ﬁrm, or a ﬁrm that remains inactive.
The state space of ﬁrm i consists of two elements: A binary variable si that indicates whether
ﬁrm i was active in the preceding period, si =2 , or inactive, si =1 , and a demand variable s0
∈ {1,...L d}.
Symmetry implies that the number of other active ﬁr m si sas u ﬃcient statistic for the vector
of other ﬁrms’ actions a−i. We denote the number of other active ﬁrms by δ. It ranges from 0 to
N − 1. Similarly, the number of other ﬁr m sw i t ha na c t i v es t a t ei sas u ﬃcient statistic for s−i.W e
14denote the number of other ﬁrms with an active state by θ. The dimensionality of the binary state
space under symmetry equals ms =2· N · Ld. Similarly, the dimensionality of the binary action
space reduces to ma =2· N.P e r i o dp r o ﬁts can be written as π (ai,δ,s i,θ,s 0).
Restriction (R1) can be imposed in the symmetric entry model by omitting the dependence on
θ in the proﬁt vector. To satisfy restriction (R2),w eﬁx the exit value of an active ﬁrm at 10,
b(a−i,1) = 10, and assume zero proﬁts for inactive ﬁrms that are inactive in the preceding period,
b(a−i,0) = 0. We assume an annual discount factor β =0 .9 and assume F is the standard normal
distribution function. By Proposition 4, if the associated restricted matrix X has rank (2 · N · Ld),
then the restricted proﬁtv e c t o rΠ is identiﬁed. In our application the rank condition is satisﬁed and
the restricted proﬁt parameters are indeed identiﬁed.
So far, we have described properties of the dynamic equilibrium and established conditions that
permit identiﬁcation of the parameters of the model. We illustrated the identiﬁcation conditions for
symmetric entry games in more detail. The next section addresses how to estimate the parameters.
5 Estimation Approach
This section proposes our estimator. Our estimation strategy follows the steps in the identiﬁcation
argument. First, we estimate the choice probabilities. Second, we infer the period proﬁt parameters
by using the linear equation (10). We characterize the properties of the estimator. We conclude the
section with a discussion of the estimator for symmetric entry games and the restrictions imposed
on the estimator by our data.
The potential number of ﬁrms may not be observed. By assumption, the probability that all
potential ﬁrms are observed (are active) in a given period is positive and bounded away from zero.
An estimator b N for the potential number of ﬁr m si st h e nt h em a x i m u mn u m b e ro fﬁrms observed in
any period, b N =m a x t Nt.I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that the estimator b N is consistent and supereﬃcient, as
it converges a rate faster than
√
T. The fast rate of convergence of b N implies that the asymptotic
properties of the choice probabilities estimator and proﬁt parameters estimator will not be aﬀected
by b N. We can proceed as if N is known.
The choices and states are multinomially distributed. This follows from the assumption that
the set of feasible actions and states is ﬁnite. Let p(k,i,s) denote the probability that ﬁrm i
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)=1for all a ∈ A,s ∈ S.W e
assume that the vector of state variables at time t =0 , s0, is exogenous. An examination of the ﬁrst














Moreover, the solution to the ﬁrst order condition is unique.
Let θ =( p(k,i,s),g(a,s,s
0
),i∈ N,k ∈ {1,...,K},s∈ S,a ∈ A,s
0
∈ S\sms) denote the param-
eter vector which already incorporates the restriction that probabilities sum to one. Let Dθ` denote
the gradient of the log likelihood function. Let Iθ = E (Dθ`)·(Dθ`)
0
denote the Fischer information
matrix. Billingsley (1961) establishes the asymptotic properties of maximum likelihood estimators
for Markov processes, as the number of periods T goes to inﬁnity. The Markovian structure of the
observed controlled process (st) follows directly from the assumption that the proﬁtability shock
realizations are conditionally independently distributed, the decision rules are Markovian, and the
distribution of proﬁtability shocks is exogenous. The maximum likelihood estimator b θT is consistent









Let Π = ψ(θ) denote the identiﬁed proﬁt vector. We propose to estimate the proﬁtv e c t o r
by evaluating the function ψ at the value of the maximum likelihood estimator of the choice and
transition probabilities, b Π = ψ(b θ). The properties of the estimator can be deduced by using the
delta method. An examination of equation (10) reveals that ψ is continuously diﬀerentiable. Let
Dθψ denote the gradient of the function ψ. By application of the delta method, see Theorem 3.1 in













Moroever, Lemma 8.14 in Van Der Vaart (1998) implies that the estimator ψ(b θT) is asymptotically
eﬃcient.
The estimator is computationally very simple. Before proceeding with the application, we discuss
the restrictions that our data impose on the estimator in more detail.
Estimation of Symmetric Entry Games
16We assume a deterministic state transition rule and do not estimate g. The assumption is satisﬁed
if agents have perfect foresight concerning the evolution of the exogenous demand process measured
by the gross domestic product. Actions are binary, K =1 , yielding a binomial choice model.
We do not observe actions for a number of states because these states did not occur in our sample
period. These data limitations lead us to adopt a parametric framework for the choice probabilities.
We parameterize the choice probability in the following way:
p(1,i,s)=Φ(α · s)
where Φ denotes the standard normal distribution and α · s denotes a linear function of the state
variables. The linear function is given by:







i=2} denotes an indicator function that equals one if ﬁrm i is active in the preceding period




j=2} denotes the Number of Other Active Firms, and st
0 denotes
the log gross domestic product.
ProﬁtV a l u eE s t i m a t e s :With the estimator b α in hand, we infer ε, calculate the probability ma-
trices Pi,P,Gand the vector Di. We assume an annual discount factor β =0 .9.A l lt h ec o e ﬃcients
in the linear equation (10) are available and we infer the restricted period proﬁt parameters. As
explained above, the standard errors for the period proﬁt parameters are calculated using the delta
method.
The next section introduces our data for pubs, restaurants, coﬀeehouses, carpenters, and bakeries
for two Lower Austrian cities.
6D a t a
This section introduces our data set and gives descriptive statistics.
We have collected quarterly time series information on the identity of active pubs, restaurants,
coﬀeehouses, carpenters and bakeries in two Austrian cities between 1982 and 2002. The data were
obtained from Lower Austrian Chamber of Business. The data list all active pubs, restaurants,
coﬀeehouses, carpenters, and bakeries in two small sized Austrian cities, Amstetten and Baden.
Baden has about 24,000 inhabitants. Amstetten is of similar size with a population of about 23,000.
We supplemented the information with quarterly gross domestic product information for Austria.
(Table I about here)
17Table I provides summary statistics. The ﬁrst ﬁve columns consider Baden and the next ﬁve
columns consider Amstetten. The ﬁrst column in the table shows that on average there are 17.01
pubs active in Baden. The number of active pubs ranges between 12 and 22 with a standard deviation
of 2.07. There is a substantial pub turnover in Baden. A total of 49 pubs were opened, while a total
of 53 pubs were closed. Not adjusting for truncation at the beginning and the end of the sample
period, the average active spell of a pub equals about 21.3 quarters.
Column two considers restaurants in Baden. On average a total of 13.26 restaurants are active
in Baden. The number of active restaurants ranges between 6 and 25 with a standard deviation of
4.69. There is some turnover. A total of 38 restaurants were opened, while a total of 20 restaurants
were closed. The average active spell of a restaurants equals about 25.32 quarters.
Column three considers coﬀeehouses in Baden. On average a total of 13.81 coﬀeehouses are active
in Baden with the number of active coﬀeehouses ranging between 9 and 18. There is turnover. A
total of 44 coﬀeehouses were opened, while a total of 40 coﬀeehouses were closed. The average active
spell of a coﬀeehouse equals about 21.89 quarters.
Column four considers carpenters in Baden. On average a total of 11.29 carpenters are active
in Baden. The number of active carpenters ranges between 9 and 15 with a standard deviation of
1.63. There is less turnover than for pubs, restaurants, or coﬀeehouses. A total of 16 carpenters
were opened, while a total of 12 carpenters were closed. The average active spell of a carpenters
equals about 37.92 quarters.
Column ﬁve considers bakeries in Baden. On average a total of 9 bakers are active in Baden
ranging between 7 and 11 at any point in time. Turnover is not very pronounced with 8 bakery
openings and 9 bakery closings during the sample period. The average active spell of bakery is about
44.47 quarters.
Columns six to ten report summary statistics for pubs, restaurants, coﬀeehouses, carpenters and
bakeries in Amstetten, respectively. The average number of businesses is similar to the numbers in
Baden. On average there are about 21.52 pubs, 8.33 restaurants, 14.37 coﬀeehouses, 13.6 carpenters
and 8.88 bakeries in Amstetten. The number of newly opened businesses equals 14 and 15 for bakeries
and carpenters, and 48 and 50 for pubs and coﬀeehouses, respectively. There are 14 closings for
bakeries and carpenters and 45 and 30 closings for pubs and coﬀeehouses, respectively. The average
active spell of a business in Amstetten ranges between 21.95 for coﬀeehouses and 42.30 for carpenters.
In summary, the data provide us with time series information on the identity of active pubs,
restaurants, coﬀeehouses, carpenters and bakeries in two selected Austrian towns, Baden and Am-
stetten, over a time period of more than 20 years. There is persistence in the active spell of businesses.
Bakeries and carpenters remain open for about ten years while pubs, coﬀeehouses and restaurants
18remain open for about 5 to 6 years. There is considerable turnover in these professions. In Baden
a new pub is opened on average every half year, and a pub is closed at the same rate. Similarly a
restaurant and coﬀeehouse opens every half year. For bakeries there is less turnover. In Baden a
new bakery opens every 2 to 3 years and a bakery closes with the same frequency.
7 Estimation Results
This section reports our estimates. We begin with a description of the choice probability estimates.
Then, we assess the goodness of ﬁt of the empirical model by sampling from the distribution of choice
probability estimates and comparing the resulting distribution of pseudo samples to the observed
data. Finally, we describe the period proﬁt parameter estimates.
Table II reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of being active. We assume
symmetric behavior and pool the decisions of all ﬁrms within a profession and city. The total number
of ﬁrms ranges between 11 and 29 across professions and cities. The number is tabulated in Table
I. Explanatory variables include Lagged Active which is a dummy variable that equals one if the
ﬁrm was active in the preceding period, the Number of Other Active Firms equals the number of
other ﬁrms that were active in the preceding period, an interaction term between Lagged Active and
the Number of Other Active Firms, and Log GDP which measures the logarithm of the Austrian
gross domestic product. In all speciﬁcations, we can reject the null that the coeﬃcients are jointly
insigniﬁcant.
(Table II about here)
We interpret the estimates in Table II by evaluating the probability of being active at the sample
mean of Log GDP and the sample median of the Number of Other Active Firms: For all professions
in both cities, Lagged Active has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the decision to be active. For pubs
in Baden, Lagged Active increases the probability of being active in the next period by 84%.I n
other professions the number ranges between 83% and 94%. The evidence in Amstetten is somewhat
stronger. Lagged Active increases the probability of being active in the next period by 90% for pubs.
In other professions the number ranges between 89% and 96%.
Number of Other Active Firms has a signiﬁcant eﬀect in three professions in Baden and in all
professions in Amstetten. In both cities and all professions, increasing the Number of Other Active
Firms by one has a negative eﬀect on being active. The magnitude of the eﬀect of increasing the
Number of Other Active Firms by one is small, ranging between −0.2% and −1.3% in Baden. In
Amstetten the eﬀect ranges between −0.4% and −1.1%.
19Log GDP has a positive eﬀect in two of ﬁve professions in Baden. Increasing Log GDP by 1%
increases the probability of being active by 5.8% for restaurants, by 8.2% for carpenters. For pubs,
coﬀeehouses and bakeries the eﬀect diﬀers. There a 1% increase in Log GDP lowers the probability
of being active by 6.9%, 3.1% and 1.9%, respectively. In Amstetten, Log GDP has a positive eﬀect
on being active in all professions. The Log GDP eﬀect ranges between 0.1%a n d7.6%.
Higher order terms for the Number of Other Active Firms can be included in the speciﬁcation of
the choice probabilities. It turns out that higher order terms are not signiﬁcant for most professions.
We conducted likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients of second order terms
for Number of Other Active Firms are equal to zero. In Baden, the null cannot be rejected at the
t e np e r c e n tl e v e li nf o u ro fﬁve professions. In Amstetten, the null cannot be rejected at the ten
percent level in three of ﬁve professions. The exceptions are restaurants in Baden, and pubs and
coﬀeehouses in Amstetten.
Symmetry is imposed in the speciﬁcation of Table II. With a suﬃciently rich data set, asymmetry
could be accounted for in the estimation. Asymmetry, which is sometimes referred to as unobserved
heterogeneity in the empirical literature, can be accounted for in the estimation. For example,
choice probabilities can be estimated for each ﬁrm individually by using a full set of state variables
as explanatory variables. The coeﬃcients would then account for possible asymmetric eﬀects of
opponents’ state variables. Unfortunately, the number of parameters for a full asymmetric model
exceeds what is feasible for the limited information available in our data. None the less, we consider
as i m p l i ﬁed speciﬁcation that permits some asymmetries between ﬁrms.
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity is tested in the following way: We re-estimate the
probit model by including a set of ﬁrm speciﬁc dummy variables, in addition to the variables listed
in Table II. We conduct two tests: First, we test the null hypothesis of jointly not signiﬁcant eﬀects
of the dummy variables. The test statistic is distributed as a chi-squared random variable. We
ﬁnd that at the one percent level the null of no signiﬁcant eﬀects cannot be rejected in four of ﬁve
professions in Baden and in all professions in Amstetten. At the ﬁve and ten percent level, the null
cannot be rejected in three of ﬁve professions in Baden and in two of ﬁve professions in Amstetten.
Our second test considers the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for the four explanatory variables
in Table II are equal between two speciﬁcations: with and without ﬁrm dummies. The Wald test
statistic is distributed as a chi-squared random variable with four degrees of freedom. We ﬁnd that
the null cannot be rejected for all professions in Baden and Amstetten at the ten percent level. We
can conclude that asymmetries do not appear an important concern in our data.
As a measure of goodness of ﬁt of the choice probability estimates in Table II we conduct the
following experiment. We draw a random sample from the distribution of choice parameter estimates.
20We then simulate one path of the ﬁrms’ choices by randomly drawing from the distribution associated
with the choice parameter estimates. We repeat the exercise 100 times and compare the simulated
paths to the observed path. Summary statistics for the observed path are given in Table I. Both, in
Baden and Amstetten, the simulated average number of ﬁrms is somewhat lower than the observed
number for all professions but the diﬀerence is small in magnitude. We cannot reject the null of
no diﬀerences for all ﬁve professions in both cities. Comparing the number of entrants, exits and
activity spells between the simulated and observed data reveals the following: In both, Baden and
Amstetten, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the observed and the simulated number of
entrants, exits and activity spells in all ﬁve professions. The choice probability estimates explain
turnovers accurately.
Estimates of period proﬁtp a r a m e t e r sin Baden and Amstetten are reported in Tables III and IV,
respectively. As described above, we ﬁx the annual discount parameter β at 0.9,a s s u m et h a tF is
the standard normal distribution function, assume zero proﬁt for inactive ﬁrms that remain inactive,
and ﬁx the exit value at 10. We assume a deterministic transition rule for GDP. For out of sample
future time periods, we assume that the GDP level is constant and equal to the GDP value achieved
in 2002. Under these assumptions, for all ﬁve professions in both cities, the restricted matrix X
appearing in equation (10) has rank (2 · N · Ld). By Proposition 4, the restricted proﬁt vector is
identiﬁed. Tables III and IV report period proﬁt estimates of an active ﬁrm for the Number of Other
Active Firms ranging from zero to N − 1, and for two selected GDP levels. The high GDP level
amounts to 12.80 in logs, achieved in the second quarter in 1992, and the low GDP level amounts to
12.53 in logs, achieved in the ﬁrst quarter in 1982. Both values are at least 10 years prior to the time
period where the GDP level becomes constant. Additionally, we report entry cost estimates which
are deﬁned as the proﬁtd i ﬀerence between active and inactive states, π(1,δ,2,s 0) − π(1,δ,1,s 0).
We report entry cost estimates at the low GDP level only, as there is a negligibly small eﬀect of
GDP on entry costs.
(Table III about here)
The interpretation of the coeﬃcient estimates in Table III is the following: Baden’s entry cost
estimates are signiﬁcantly negative in all professions for all state variables. The entry cost estimates
range between 11.35 and 16.06. For four of ﬁve professions the entry cost decreases monotonically
with an increase in the Number of Other Active Firms suggesting that entry becomes less costly
when more ﬁrms are active. The exception is bakeries. For bakeries, the entry cost increases with
an increase in the Number of Other Active Firms.
Period proﬁt estimates of a pub that was active in the preceding period in Baden are given in
21columns 2 and 4. They range between 0.16 and 0.42. The proﬁt estimates are highest with few
active ﬁrms and fall as the Number of Other Active Firms increases. For other professions a number
of proﬁt estimates are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Period proﬁt estimates typically
fall as the Number of Other Active Firms increases. An exception are coﬀeehouse proﬁte s t i m a t e s
which increase initially and, then, decrease, as the Number of Other Active Firms increases. Bakery
proﬁt estimates are imprecisely estimated when the Number of Other Active Firms is small leading
to large point estimates. The eﬀect of GDP on period proﬁts varies across professions. Carpenter
and restaurant proﬁt estimates increase with an increase in GDP. The proﬁt estimates for other
professions fall with an increase in GDP.
(Table IV about here)
The estimates in Amstetten are qualitatively similar to Baden. An examination of Table IV
reveals that the entry cost estimates are signiﬁcant negative in all professions for all state variables
in Amstettten. The entry cost estimates range between 12.08 and 21.66. For all professions the entry
cost decreases monotonically with an increase in the Number of Other Active Firms suggesting that
entry becomes less costly when more ﬁrms are active.
Period proﬁt estimates of a ﬁrm that was active in the preceding period in Amstetten are mostly
positive. A number of proﬁt estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. An increase in the Num-
ber of Other Active Firms decreases period proﬁts on most occasions in accordance with economic
intuition. For restaurants, coﬀeehouses and carpenters the eﬀect of an increase in the Number of
Other Active Firms is positive on occasions. For instance, as the Number of Other Active Firms
increases coﬀeehouse proﬁt estimates evaluated at the high GDP level fall, then increase, and then
fall again, while coﬀeehouse proﬁt estimates evaluated at the low GDP level fall for all of the range.
The eﬀect of GDP on period proﬁts is positive but small in magnitude on most occasions.
The proﬁt parameter estimates in Tables III and IV illustrate substantial payoﬀ diﬀerences
between newly entered and already active ﬁrms consistent with dynamic entry models. The entry
cost estimates are of much larger magnitude than the proﬁt estimates implying that it takes a number
of periods to recover the entry cost. We constructed a Chi-Squared test of the null hypothesis that
the Number of Other Active Firms has no eﬀect on proﬁt estimates. We can reject the null of no
eﬀect in all professions and both cities. An increase in the Number of Other Active Firms decreases
the proﬁt estimates in most professions and GDP levels.
The estimates in Tables III and IV rely on two identifying assumptions. These assumptions are
an annual discount factor β ﬁxed at 0.9,a n dt h ee x i tv a l u eﬁxed at 10. The eﬀect of the identifying
assumptions on the parameter estimates is readily illustrated. An increase in the discount factor β,
22decreases the proﬁt estimates at all state variables. The entry cost estimates remain unaﬀected by a
change in the discount factor as they are deﬁned as the proﬁtd i ﬀerence between active and inactive
states, π (1,δ,2,s 0) − π (1,δ,1,s 0). An increase in the exit value lowers the entry cost by exactly
the same amount. In the extreme scenario in which the exit value is zero, most entry cost estimates
in Tables III and IV remain negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. An increase in the exit
value magniﬁes the proﬁt estimates for active ﬁrms.
With the proﬁt estimates at hand, we can numerically calculate equilibria by using equation
(8). From section 3 we know that the numerical calculation need not yield the equilibrium outcome
that is observed because the model can exhibit multiple equilibria. However, in our case, repeated
numerical calculations yield choice probabilities almost identical to the choice probability estimates
in Table II. A possible reason is that the zeros of equation (8) are locally unique. With starting values
that are not too far away from the choice probability estimates in Table II, numerical algorithms
tend to converge to the same solution.
In sum, the estimates of choice probabilities ﬁt the time series data for pubs, restaurants, cof-
feehouses, carpenters and bakeries in Baden and Amstetten well. Our goodness of ﬁtt e s ti n d i c a t e s
that the model explains the data accurately. The proﬁt parameter estimates conﬁrm substantial
payoﬀ diﬀerences between newly entered and already active ﬁrms consistent with dynamic entry
models. Additionally, we can reject the null that the Number of Other Active Firms has no eﬀect
in all professions conﬁrming the importance of strategic eﬀects. The eﬀect of the Number of Other
A c t i v eF i r m so np e r i o dp r o ﬁt estimates has the expected sign in most professions. With all the
proﬁt estimates at hand, we can illustrate ﬁrms’ decisions and assess policy questions. This is done
in the next section.
8 Value Function Estimates and Entry Tax
This section considers two applications of our estimates. Subsection 8.1. depicts the long run
expected discounted sum of payoﬀs to active and inactive ﬁrms. Subsection 8.2. conducts the policy
experiments in which the regulator imposes a unit tax on ﬁrms wishing to enter.
8.1 Value Function Estimates
This section illustrates our estimates for the discounted sum of ﬁrms’ payoﬀs for carpenters in Baden.
We select carpenters in Baden to illustrate interesting payoﬀ diﬀerences between active and inactive
ﬁrms. Additionally, we illustrate diﬀerences between short and long run payoﬀs. Estimates for other
23professions yield qualitatively similar results. The discounted sum of payoﬀsi sc a l c u l a t e df r o mt h e
period proﬁt estimates by using the formula given in equation (3) in section 2.
( F i g u r e s1-4a b o u th e r e )
Figures 1 to 4 depict the ex ante value function estimates as a function of the Number of Other
A c t i v eF i r m s . T h ee xa n t ev a l u ef u n c t i o ni sd e ﬁned as the expected discounted sum of payoﬀs
before the proﬁtability shock is observed and before the action is taken. The ex ante value function
is plotted as a solid line. The remaining state variables, active or inactive and the GDP level, are
ﬁxed at four distinct values. These values include inactive ﬁrms at a high GDP level, active ﬁrms
at a high GDP level, inactive ﬁrms at a low GDP level, and active ﬁrms at a low GDP level. The
dotted lines in Figures 1 to 4 depict 90% conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 1 shows that the ex ante value function of an inactive ﬁrm at the high GDP level ranges
between 1.74 and 1.95, and does not change signiﬁcantly as the Number of Other Active Firms
increases. Figure 2 shows that the ex ante value of an active ﬁrm at the high GDP level is substan-
tially higher than that of an inactive ﬁrm. It ranges between 13.19 and 16.79.T h el e v e ld i ﬀerence
is attributable to the entry cost. The ex ante value function of an active ﬁrm declines signiﬁcantly
as the Number of Other Active Firms increases. The reason is that an additional ﬁrm lowers the
expected period payoﬀ to an active ﬁrm. In total, the ex ante value function declines by about 27%
as the Number of Other Active Firms increases from 0 to 14.
The value function estimates at the low GDP level, which are depicted in Figures 3 and 4, are
qualitatively similar to those in Figures 1 and 2. The eﬀect of a reduction in the GDP level is to
decrease the value function estimates. The value function of an inactive ﬁrm is again almost constant
in the Number of Other Active Firms at about 1.0, while the value function of an active ﬁrm falls
with an increase in the Number of Other Active Firms. It falls from 15.40 to 11.93.T h e e x a n t e
value function estimate declines by about 29% as the Number of Other Active Firms increases from
0t o1 4 .
Comparing the long run value function estimates with the short run proﬁt estimates in Table
III reveals that GDP and the Number of Other Active Firms have a stronger eﬀect in the short run
than in the long run.
8.2 Entry Tax
This section reports a policy experiment of a tax on entry. We select carpenters in Baden and assess
the eﬀect of the tax on the equilibrium outcome.
24The experiment is as follows: We draw a random sample from the distribution of proﬁte s t i m a t e s
for carpenters described in Table III. We increase the entry cost estimate by one unit at all state
variables. We then numerically calculate the new equilibrium based on the modiﬁed period payoﬀs
by using equation (8). The equilibrium choice probabilities are then used to simulate one path of
ﬁrms’ choices by randomly drawing from the distribution associated with the equilibrium choice
parameters. We repeat the exercise 60 times and compare the simulated after tax equilibrium paths
to the observed path. Summary statistics for the observed path are given in Table I.
Somewhat surprisingly, the tax does not aﬀect the distribution of the number of active ﬁrms
signiﬁcantly. The after tax simulated average number of active ﬁrms equals 11.14 with a standard
deviation of 0.64. The number is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the mean number of active ﬁrms in
Table I which equals 11.29. The minimum and maximum number of active ﬁrms on average across
simulations equal 13.7 and 8.83, respectively, which are again not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
before tax counterpart in Table I.
The tax alters the number of turnovers. Turnovers become less frequent. The number of entrants
falls by more than 50%, from 16 to 6.93 on average across simulations. The number of exiting ﬁrms
falls by about 80%, from 12 to 2.6 on average. The reduction in the number of turnovers is signiﬁcant
with standard deviations across simulations of 2.02 and 1.83 for the number of entrants and exiting
ﬁrms, respectively. The duration of the mean active spell increases by about 60%t o59.44.T h e
increase in the mean active spell is signiﬁcant.
The reduction in turnovers as a result of the tax can be explained by using the indiﬀerent type
a n a l y s i sd e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n3 .T h er a n g eo fp r o ﬁtability shocks in which an inactive ﬁrm decides
to enter is reduced as a larger proﬁtability shock is required to oﬀset the increased entry cost. On
the other hand, the range of proﬁtability shocks in which an active ﬁrm decides to remain active
is increased as the continuation value when exiting is reduced due to the tax. Hence, the ex ante
expected proﬁtability shock when active is reduced.
An examination of the average value functions across simulations reveals the following: The
expected discounted sum of payoﬀs for an inactive ﬁrm is substantially reduced due to the tax. The
reduction is signiﬁcant. The value function of an inactive ﬁrm, evaluated at the high or low GDP
level which is depicted in Figures 1 and 3, falls by 56%t o63% across the range of the Number of
Other Active Firms. The decrease in value ranges between 1.05 and 1.10 in absolute value at the
high GDP level and between 0.57 and 0.59 in absolute value at the low GDP level.
For most of the range of state variables, active ﬁrms take a small percentage fall in expected
discounted sum of payoﬀs. The change ranges between −7% and +2% across the range of all state
variables, but is not signiﬁcant at any point. The change in absolute value at the high GDP level
25ranges between −0.21 and −0.97. The change in absolute value at the low GDP level ranges between
−0.48 and +0.25.
We calculate the tax eﬀect on all ﬁrms as the diﬀerence in the sum of pre and post value functions
of all ﬁrms combined. The net tax eﬀect on ﬁrms is negative. The total loss ranges between -2.92
and -8.77 across the range of the number of active ﬁrms. Some of the ﬁrms’ losses will be oﬀset
by the revenues generated by the tax. We ﬁnd that the expected sum of discounted tax revenues
ranges between +2.37 and +7.55 over the range of the number of active ﬁrms. Adding the net tax
eﬀect on ﬁrms and the tax revenues implies a total tax eﬀect ranging between -4.78 and +0.45 over
the range of the number of ﬁrms. As the number of active ﬁrms increases, the total eﬀect increases
initially, peaking between 6 and 7 ﬁrms, and then decreases. The total tax eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for any number of ﬁrms.
Increasing the tax to three units yields results qualitatively similar to the unit tax case: The
distribution of the number of active ﬁrms remains not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the before tax
distribution. The number of turnovers and the expected discounted sum of payoﬀs for an inactive
ﬁrm are reduced due to the tax and more so than with a unit tax. The average value function
of an active ﬁrm becomes steeper with the three-unit tax. It is higher with a small Number of
Other Active Firms and lower with a large Number of Other Active Firms relative to the before
tax value function. The diﬀerence is marginally signiﬁcant at some values of the Number of Other
Active Firms. The total tax eﬀect, calculated as the sum of the net tax eﬀect on ﬁr m sp l u st h et a x
revenues, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for most of the range of the number of ﬁrms. It is
marginally signiﬁcant positive with seven to nine ﬁrms and marginally signiﬁcant negative with 15
ﬁrms.
In sum, the tax does not aﬀect the long-run number of active ﬁrms. Instead, it reduces the
frequency of turnovers as it makes entry more costly. The tax adversely aﬀects inactive ﬁr m sa st h e
cost of entry is increased. Already active ﬁrms are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the tax for most of
the range of the number of ﬁrms. Taking the tax revenues into account, the total eﬀect on the sum
of future discounted payoﬀsi so no c c a s i o n sp o s i t i v eb u tn o ts i g n i ﬁcant for most of the range of the
number of ﬁrms.
9C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes a new estimation method for Markovian games with ﬁnite actions. The basis of
our analysis is a necessary and suﬃcient equilibrium condition for dynamic games. The equilibrium
condition permits us to characterize the identiﬁcation conditions of the underlying model parameters.
26We propose an estimation method following the steps in the identiﬁcation argument. The estimator
is eﬃcient and computationally easy to implement. We apply the proposed estimator to time series
data on entry and exit decisions for a number of professions in two Austrian cities. The model ﬁts
t h ed a t aw e l l . D y n a m i ce ﬀects are important as active ﬁrms are very likely to remain active in
the next period. We calculate the eﬀect of an entry tax on the equilibrium outcome. Somewhat
surprisingly, the distribution of active ﬁrms does not change signiﬁcantly as a result of the tax but
the number of turnovers is reduced signiﬁcantly. While the characterization of the identiﬁcation
conditions is reasonably complete, the estimator is computationally simple, and policy experiments
can be conducted, there are at least two shortcomings in our analysis:
First, not all the primitives of the model are identiﬁable as the discount factor and the dis-
tribution of unobserved proﬁtability shocks are not identiﬁed. It may be possible to alleviate the
non-identiﬁcation concern by adopting a formulation that omits the proﬁtability shock. In the
absence of a proﬁtability shock, ﬁrms will not necessarily adopt pure strategies. Instead, ﬁrms
may randomize between alternative actions. The resulting mixed strategy equilibrium will generate
endogenously a distribution over diﬀerent outcomes which may form the basis for an alternative
estimation approach.
Second, the assumption of Markovian strategies is restrictive as it does not permit full history
dependent behavior. An increase in the state space would permit strategies to be richer functions
of past actions. However, full history dependent behavior, which plays a prominent role in the
development of the theory of strategic dynamic games, cannot be captured.
10 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Consider a typical ﬁrm i deciding between action k and action 0 at any
state s. By assumption, the payoﬀ function is linear in the private proﬁtability shock εk.I ft h e r e
exists a point εk such that a ﬁrm of type εk is indiﬀerent between actions k and 0,t h e na n yt y p e
with a smaller proﬁtability shock, εk < εk, will prefer action 0 to action k. On the other hand, any
type with a higher proﬁtability shock, εk > εk, will prefer action k to action 0. The reason is that
the proﬁtability shock εk aﬀects the current period payoﬀ under action k only. Future payoﬀsa n d
current period payoﬀs under action k
0
6= k are unaﬀected by εk.
Next, consider a type (εk,εk
0
) for any k,k
0
6=0 . By transitivity, if the type is indiﬀerent between
actions k and 0, and indiﬀerent between actions 0 and k
0
, then the type is also indiﬀerent between
action k and k
0




,t h e nt y p e(εk,εk
0
)
prefers action k to actions k
0




,t h e nt y p e(εk,εk
0
) prefers action k
0
27to actions k and 0.
Finally, we need to show that the indiﬀerent points ε =( ε1,...,εK) exist. The indiﬀerent εk
type receives the same expected discounted sum of payoﬀs under action k as under action 0,w h i c h
































By assumption, the period return Πi and the ex ante expected proﬁtability shock are bounded. The
discount factor β is less than 1 and, hence, the value function is bounded. In turn this implies
that the ﬁrst expression on the left hand side and the expression on the right hand side in equation
(12) are bounded. Hence, the indiﬀerent point εk, which equals the diﬀerence between those two
expressions, is contained in a bounded interval, and there exists a ﬁnite positive number E such that
εk ∈ [−E,E]. Hence, the indiﬀerent points ε =( ε1,...,εK) must exist, since, by assumption, the
support of εk is unbounded. This establishes the result.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . First, we show that equation (7) must be satisﬁed in any equilibrium.
It is an immediate consequence from Proposition 1, that for every i the indiﬀerent εk
i type receives


































Equation (13) is a necessary equilibrium condition that must be satisﬁed at every state s ∈ S and
for every action k =1 ,...,K yielding a total of ms · K equations with ms · k indiﬀerent types,
one for each possible state and action. We may compactly write equation (13) in matrix form.
Let εi =[ εi (s)]s∈S be the (ms · K) × 1 dimensional vector of indiﬀerent types; let P−i be the
ms×ms·(K +1 )
N−1 dimensional matrix consisting of choice probability Pr(a−i|s) in row s column




6= s; and deﬁne the (ms · K) × (ma · ms)
28dimensional matrix Pi (ε) as:
ai =
01 2 ... K
Pi (ε)=
z }| { 
     

−P−i P−i 0 ... 0
−P−i 0 P−i ... 0
. . . 00
... 0
−P−i 00 ... P −i

     

We can re-state equation (13) as:
Pi (ε)Πi + βPi (ε)GVi + εi =0 (14)
Next, we substitute equation (3) into equation (14) to obtain an equation that characterizes the
equilibrium indiﬀerence points εi. To do so, notice that the vector of ex ante expected proﬁtability



















which leads us to the characterization stated in the Proposition. This establishes the ﬁrst part.
N e x t ,w et a k ef o re v e r yﬁrm i av e c t o rεi that satisﬁes equation (7). We need to construct a
Markovian strategy, beliefs and a continuation value and show that they constitute an equilibrium.


















i (s) for all k.
The above decision rule yields beliefs which we denote with the choice probability matrix P (ε).T h e
decision rule also implies expected proﬁt a b i l i t ys h o c k sw h i c hw ed e n o t ea sDi (ε).A s i n e q u a t i o n
(3), the value function is then given by:
Vi =[ Is − βP (ε)G]
−1 [P (ε)Πi + Di (ε)].
By construction, the decision rule is optimal for the above continuation value and beliefs. Further,
the beliefs are consistent. This establishes the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 1. We need to show that equation (7) has a solution. We can re-write the
equation to deﬁne the function h =( h1,...,h N) with component hi given by:
εi = hi(ε)
= −Pi (ε)Πi − βPi (ε)G[Is − βP (ε)G]
−1 [P (ε)Πi + Di (ε)]
29A ﬁxed point of the function h will be a zero of equation (7). By assumption, the expected period
payoﬀ is bounded and, hence, the ex ante value function is bounded. As is shown in the proof of
Proposition 1, we can deduce that the set of indiﬀerence points εi is contained in some bounded
interval [−E,E]
ms·K for some E. In turn, this implies that h has domain and range [−E,E]
ms·K·N.
The elements entering the function h are continuous, as the decision rule, characterized in Propo-
sition 1, and the resulting choice probability matrix are continuous in ε.B r o u w e r ’ s ﬁxed point
theorem implies that there exists a ﬁxed point ε of the function h. By Proposition 2, the ﬁxed point
corresponds to an equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 1. The arguments in the proofs of Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Theo-
rem 1 do not rely on asymmetry. The same arguments remain valid with the symmetry assumption
in place.
Proof of Lemma 1. Pick any state s ∈ S and ﬁrm i ∈ N.D e n o t ew i t hφ
k (ε) the probability
that action k is chosen. Elementary calculus shows that the probability equals:
φ
k (ε)=P r ( εk






















l(ε) denote the probability of action 0.I t e q u a l s
Q
k
0≥1 F(εk).L e t Pk




1 (ε) − P1,...,φ
K (ε) − PK
´
.Az e r oo ft h ef u n c t i o nψ corresponds to a solution
in equation (9). By assumption, the function F is diﬀerentiable and, hence, φ is diﬀerentiable.
Taking the derivative shows that φ satisﬁes the gross substitute property:
∂φk





6= k.L e tDψ denote the gradient of ψ. Since, by construction,
PK
l=0 φ












∂εk0 . Hence, Dψ is
non-singular.
We show that there exists a ε such that ψ
l(ε) < 0 for all l ≥ 1. By assumption the probability














The ﬁrst inequality uses that F(εk)K−1 ≤ 1. The second inequality uses that by construction,
F(ε1 − 1) = 1 − δ and, thus,
R ∞
ε1 f(ε)dε < δ.S i n c ePl ≥ δ, it follows that ψ
l(ε1,...,ε1) < 0 for all
30l ≥ 1.
Next, we show that there exists a ε such that ψ




l(ε) > 0.T os e et h i s ,ﬁx εk = ε1 for all k
0

















l=1 Pl =1−P0 with P0 bounded away from zero, we can pick ε1 suﬃciently low, and have
PK
l=1 ψ








(ε) > 0 while holding
PK
l=1 ψ




approaches zero, there must exist a ε such that ψ
l(ε) > 0 for all l ≥ 1.
Since there exist ε,ε such that ψ
l(ε) > 0, ψ
l(ε) < 0 for all l ≥ 1,b yc o n t i n u i t yo fψ there exists
a ε such that ψ
l (ε)=0for all l ≥ 1.
It remains to show that the zero is unique. Suppose there are two zeros. That is there are ε,ε
0












00 =0for all l ≥ 1. The gradient Dψ evaluated at ε
00
must be singular,
contradicting the non-singularity of Dψ. Hence, the zero is unique.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Part (iii): Pick any strict monotone and continuous distribution
function F deﬁned on < and pick any β. By Lemma 1, there is a unique ε(F) and D(F). For any
ﬁrm i, condition (7) consists of K · LN equations of the form AjΠi + Bj =0in which the numbers
in Aj and Bj are given. The unknown parameter vector Πi has a total of (K +1)N ·LN parameters.
Clearly, the number of parameters exceeds the number of equations, and elementary properties of
linear equations establish that the parameter vector Πi is not identiﬁed.
Parts (i) and (ii) follow immediately from part (iii).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . By deﬁnition, the matrix Xi is of dimension (K ·LN)×((K +1 )
N ·
LN),a n dt h ep r o ﬁtv e c t o rΠi of dimension ((K +1 )
N · LN) × 1.R e s t r i c t i o n(R1) ﬁxes (K +1 )
N ·
(LN −L) proﬁt parameters, leaving a total of (K +1 )
N ·L proﬁt parameters unknown. Restriction
(R2) ﬁxes additionally (K +1 )
N−1 · L proﬁt parameters. Imposing restrictions (R1) and (R2)





K · (K +1 )
N−1 · L
´
. It is obtained
by summing columns in the unrestricted matrix Xi which are associated with identical proﬁtv a l u e s .
The restricted proﬁt parameter vector Πi has dimension
³




By elementary properties of linear equations, the parameter vector Πi is identiﬁed provided the
matrix Xi has full column rank. Full column rank is achieved if the rank equals K · (K +1 )
N−1 ·
L.N o w , t h e n u m b e r o f r o w s i n Xi equals K · LN, while the number of columns in Xi equals
31K · (K +1 )
N−1 · L. Clearly, if L ≥ K +1 , then the matrix Xi c a nh a v ef u l lc o l u m nr a n k . T h i s
establishes part (ii) in the Proposition. On the other hand, if L<K+1, then the rank of the matrix
Xi is strictly less than K · (K +1 )
N−1 · L. Hence, the matrix Xi does not have full column rank.
This establishes part (i) in the Proposition.
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33Pub Restaurant Coffeehouse Carpenter Bakery
No of Firms
Mean 17.01 13.26 13.81 11.29 9
(2.07) (4.69) (1.65) (1.63) (0.93)
Minimum 12 6 9 9 7
Maximum 22 25 18 15 11
No of Entrants 49 38 44 16 8
No of Exiting Firms 53 20 40 12 9
Mean Active Spell 21.33 25.32 21.89 37.92 44.47
(21.23) (24.52) (20.59) (30.38) (28.92)
Pub Restaurant Coffeehouse Carpenter Bakery
No of Firms
Mean 21.52 8.33 14.37 13.60 8.88
(2.56) (2.12) (6.84) (1.21) (1.52)
Minimum 17 4 5 12 7
Maximum 29 12 28 17 14
No of Entrants 48 23 50 15 14
No of Exiting Firms 45 16 30 14 14
Mean Active Spell 26.99 25.93 21.95 42.30 32.43
(24.24) (26.14) (22.27) (27.74) (27.31)
* Standard deviations are displayed in parenthesis.
Baden
Amstetten
Table I: Descriptive Statistics
*Pub Restaurant Coffeehouse Carpenter Bakery
Log Likelihood -372.73 -250.81 -302.70 -123.02 -79.11
No of Observations 1826 2075 1494 1245 913
Constant 9.61 -18.05 3.54 -26.85 9.40
(5.68) (14.03) (4.81) (12.73) (11.23)
Lagged Active 4.40 4.79 4.78 6.08 2.18
(0.88) (0.39) (0.96) (1.21) (2.33)
Number of Other Active Firms 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.31
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12) (0.23)
(Lagged Active)*(No of Other Active Firms) -0.09 -0.08 -0.14 -0.22 0.20
(0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.28)
Log GDP -0.87 1.23 -0.42 1.99 -0.66
(0.42) (1.13) (0.38) (1.06) (0.80)
Pub Restaurant Coffeehouse Carpenter Bakery
Log Likelihood -361.23 -150.76 -296.41 -125.36 -126.42
No of Observations 2407 996 2324 1411 1162
Constant -19.91 -15.41 -16.41 -6.64 -7.74
(8.33) (11.33) (19.30) (8.96) (7.19)
Lagged Active 7.98 5.51 5.94 11.66 6.74
(0.89) (0.72) (0.36) (2.07) (1.04)
Number of Other Active Firms 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.35 0.20
(0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.14) (0.10)
(Lagged Active)*(No of Other Active Firms) -0.22 -0.27 -0.15 -0.59 -0.33
(0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.15) (0.12)
Log GDP 1.30 1.03 1.05 0.03 0.33
(0.71) (0.92) (1.53) (0.75) (0.56)
* The dependent variable equals 1 if the firm is active and zero otherwise. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis.
Baden
Amstetten
Table II: Probit Estimates of the Decision to be ActiveNumber of Other Entry High GDP Low GDP Entry High GDP Low GDP Entry High GDP Low GDP Entry High GDP Low GDP Entry High GDP Low GDP
Active  Firms Cost Profit Profit Cost Profit Profit Cost Profit Profit Cost Profit Profit Cost Profit  Profit
0 14.41 0.42 0.48 14.79 0.33 0.30 14.78 0.39 0.41 16.06 0.92 0.51 11.35 323520.90 3852868.80
(0.88) (0.18) (0.29) (0.39) (0.05) (0.02) (0.96) (0.12) (0.15) (1.32) (1.76) (0.46) (2.64) (7474945) (101652130)
1 14.32 0.42 0.49 14.71 0.33 0.30 14.65 0.39 0.41 15.85 0.84 0.48 11.75 1906.56 13183.76
(0.83) (0.17) (0.28) (0.37) (0.05) (0.01) (0.89) (0.12) (0.15) (1.19) (1.38) (0.36) (2.53) (27348.29) (221337.01)
2 14.23 0.42 0.49 14.64 0.33 0.30 14.51 0.39 0.42 15.63 0.77 0.46 12.16 46.37 194.96
(0.78) (0.17) (0.27) (0.34) (0.05) (0.01) (0.82) (0.12) (0.14) (1.07) (1.07) (0.27) (2.24) (434.04) (2230.42)
3 14.14 0.41 0.49 14.56 0.33 0.30 14.37 0.40 0.42 15.42 0.71 0.43 12.53 3.88 9.48
(0.72) (0.16) (0.26) (0.31) (0.05) (0.01) (0.75) (0.11) (0.14) (0.95) (0.81) (0.20) (1.81) (18.56) (62.49)
4 14.05 0.41 0.49 14.48 0.33 0.30 14.24 0.40 0.42 15.21 0.65 0.41 12.85 1.08 1.66
(0.67) (0.15) (0.25) (0.29) (0.05) (0.01) (0.68) (0.11) (0.13) (0.83) (0.61) (0.15) (1.39) (1.99) (4.52)
5 13.96 0.41 0.49 14.40 0.33 0.29 14.10 0.40 0.43 14.99 0.60 0.39 13.12 0.60 0.75
(0.62) (0.14) (0.23) (0.26) (0.05) (0.01) (0.61) (0.10) (0.12) (0.72) (0.45) (0.10) (1.02) (0.43) (0.76)
6 13.87 0.41 0.49 14.33 0.33 0.29 13.96 0.40 0.43 14.78 0.55 0.37 13.36 0.43 0.50
(0.57) (0.13) (0.22) (0.24) (0.04) (0.01) (0.54) (0.10) (0.12) (0.60) (0.32) (0.07) (0.71) (0.13) (0.21)
7 13.78 0.41 0.48 14.25 0.33 0.29 13.82 0.40 0.43 14.57 0.51 0.35 13.59 0.36 0.40
(0.51) (0.12) (0.21) (0.22) (0.04) (0.02) (0.47) (0.09) (0.11) (0.49) (0.22) (0.05) (0.43) (0.04) (0.07)
8 13.69 0.41 0.48 14.17 0.33 0.29 13.69 0.40 0.43 14.35 0.47 0.32 13.80 0.32 0.35
(0.46) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19) (0.04) (0.02) (0.40) (0.08) (0.10) (0.39) (0.15) (0.04) (0.23) (0.01) (0.03)
9 13.60 0.40 0.48 14.09 0.33 0.28 13.55 0.39 0.43 14.14 0.43 0.28 14.01 0.30 0.32
(0.41) (0.10) (0.18) (0.17) (0.04) (0.03) (0.33) (0.07) (0.09) (0.29) (0.09) (0.05) (0.29) (0.03) (0.03)
10 13.51 0.40 0.48 14.02 0.33 0.28 13.41 0.39 0.43 13.92 0.39 0.22 14.22 0.28 0.30
(0.36) (0.09) (0.16) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.27) (0.06) (0.08) (0.21) (0.05) (0.11) (0.52) (0.05) (0.05)
11 13.42 0.39 0.47 13.94 0.33 0.28 13.27 0.38 0.42 13.69 0.33 0.09
(0.31) (0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.03) (0.04) (0.20) (0.05) (0.06) (0.18) (0.03) (0.28)
12 13.33 0.39 0.47 13.86 0.33 0.27 13.13 0.37 0.41 13.45 0.25 -0.18
(0.26) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.02) (0.05) (0.15) (0.04) (0.06) (0.23) (0.09) (0.80)
13 13.24 0.38 0.46 13.78 0.33 0.27 12.99 0.36 0.40 13.19 0.10 -0.98
(0.21) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.06) (0.12) (0.03) (0.05) (0.36) (0.27) (3.11)
14 13.15 0.37 0.45 13.71 0.32 0.27 12.85 0.33 0.38 12.88 -0.27 -4.88
(0.17) (0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.01) (0.07) (0.12) (0.03) (0.05) (0.60) (0.95) (20.97)
15 13.06 0.35 0.44 13.63 0.32 0.26 12.71 0.30 0.35
(0.13) (0.03) (0.09) (0.13) (0.01) (0.09) (0.17) (0.06) (0.07)
16 12.96 0.34 0.43 13.55 0.32 0.25 12.57 0.25 0.31
(0.11) (0.02) (0.07) (0.14) (0.02) (0.11) (0.24) (0.11) (0.10)
17 12.87 0.32 0.41 13.47 0.32 0.25 12.42 0.16 0.24
(0.11) (0.03) (0.06) (0.15) (0.03) (0.13) (0.31) (0.23) (0.19)
18 12.78 0.29 0.39 13.40 0.31 0.24
(0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.04) (0.15)
19 12.69 0.26 0.37 13.32 0.31 0.23
(0.18) (0.09) (0.05) (0.19) (0.05) (0.18)
20 12.60 0.22 0.34 13.24 0.31 0.22
(0.23) (0.14) (0.07) (0.22) (0.07) (0.21)
21 12.50 0.16 0.30 13.16 0.30 0.21
(0.28) (0.23) (0.11) (0.24) (0.09) (0.25)
22 13.08 0.29 0.19
(0.27) (0.11) (0.30)
23 13.01 0.28 0.17
(0.29) (0.14) (0.35)
24 12.93 0.27 0.15
(0.32) (0.17) (0.42)
* Standard deviations are displayed in parenthesis.
Coffeehouse Carpenter Bakery
Table III: Profit and Entry Cost Estimates in Baden
*
Pub RestaurantNumber of Other Entry High GDP Low GDP Entry High GDP Low GDP Entry High GDP Low GDP Entry High GDP Low GDP Entry High GDP Low GDP
Active  Firms Cost Profit Profit Cost Profit Profit Cost Profit Profit Cost Profit Profit Cost Profit Profit
0 17.98 0.37 0.36 15.52 0.37 0.34 15.94 0.33 0.32 21.66 0.38 0.38 16.74 0.33 0.33
(0.89) (0.03) (0.02) (0.72) (0.09) (0.04) (0.36) (0.02) (0.01) (2.27) (0.03) (0.03) (1.04) (0.01) (0.01)
1 17.77 0.37 0.35 15.25 0.37 0.34 15.79 0.33 0.31 21.07 0.38 0.38 16.41 0.33 0.32
(0.84) (0.03) (0.02) (0.64) (0.09) (0.04) (0.34) (0.02) (0.01) (1.91) (0.03) (0.02) (0.93) (0.01) (0.01)
2 17.55 0.37 0.35 14.98 0.38 0.34 15.64 0.33 0.31 20.49 0.37 0.37 16.08 0.32 0.32
(0.80) (0.03) (0.02) (0.56) (0.09) (0.04) (0.33) (0.03) (0.01) (1.77) (0.02) (0.02) (0.81) (0.01) (0.01)
3 17.33 0.36 0.35 14.71 0.38 0.34 15.49 0.33 0.31 19.90 0.37 0.37 15.75 0.32 0.32
(0.76) (0.03) (0.02) (0.48) (0.09) (0.03) (0.31) (0.03) (0.01) (1.62) (0.02) (0.02) (0.70) (0.01) (0.01)
4 17.11 0.36 0.34 14.43 0.38 0.34 15.33 0.32 0.31 19.32 0.36 0.36 15.43 0.32 0.31
(0.72) (0.04) (0.02) (0.40) (0.08) (0.03) (0.29) (0.03) (0.01) (1.47) (0.02) (0.02) (0.58) (0.01) (0.01)
5 16.89 0.36 0.34 14.16 0.39 0.33 15.18 0.33 0.31 18.73 0.35 0.35 15.10 0.32 0.31
(0.68) (0.04) (0.02) (0.32) (0.08) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.01) (1.32) (0.02) (0.02) (0.47) (0.02) (0.02)
6 16.67 0.36 0.34 13.89 0.38 0.32 15.03 0.33 0.31 18.14 0.35 0.35 14.77 0.31 0.31
(0.64) (0.04) (0.02) (0.25) (0.06) (0.04) (0.26) (0.04) (0.02) (1.17) (0.02) (0.01) (0.37) (0.02) (0.02)
7 16.45 0.36 0.34 13.62 0.38 0.30 14.88 0.33 0.31 17.56 0.34 0.34 14.44 0.31 0.30
(0.60) (0.05) (0.02) (0.19) (0.05) (0.06) (0.24) (0.04) (0.02) (1.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.27) (0.02) (0.02)
8 16.23 0.36 0.33 13.34 0.37 0.27 14.73 0.33 0.30 16.97 0.34 0.34 14.12 0.31 0.30
(0.56) (0.05) (0.02) (0.16) (0.03) (0.10) (0.22) (0.04) (0.02) (0.86) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02)
9 16.02 0.36 0.33 13.06 0.33 0.21 14.58 0.33 0.30 16.39 0.33 0.33 13.79 0.31 0.29
(0.52) (0.06) (0.02) (0.18) (0.04) (0.19) (0.21) (0.04) (0.03) (0.72) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.02) (0.04)
10 15.80 0.36 0.33 12.77 0.27 0.10 14.42 0.33 0.30 15.81 0.33 0.33 13.46 0.31 0.28
(0.48) (0.06) (0.02) (0.24) (0.11) (0.37) (0.19) (0.05) (0.03) (0.57) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.03) (0.06)
11 15.58 0.36 0.33 12.47 0.12 -0.18 14.27 0.34 0.30 15.22 0.32 0.32 13.12 0.30 0.26
(0.44) (0.07) (0.02) (0.34) (0.30) (0.93) (0.18) (0.05) (0.04) (0.43) (0.02) (0.02) (0.30) (0.06) (0.10)
12 15.36 0.37 0.33 14.12 0.34 0.30 14.64 0.32 0.32 12.78 0.27 0.22
(0.40) (0.07) (0.02) (0.16) (0.04) (0.06) (0.30) (0.04) (0.03) (0.41) (0.12) (0.19)
13 15.14 0.37 0.32 13.97 0.34 0.29 14.06 0.34 0.34 12.43 0.16 0.08
(0.36) (0.07) (0.02) (0.15) (0.04) (0.07) (0.20) (0.04) (0.04) (0.56) (0.28) (0.42)
14 14.92 0.37 0.32 13.82 0.35 0.29 13.46 0.33 0.33
(0.32) (0.07) (0.02) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) (0.19) (0.03) (0.08)
15 14.70 0.38 0.32 13.66 0.35 0.29 12.86 0.41 0.40
(0.29) (0.07) (0.02) (0.13) (0.03) (0.11) (0.25) (0.22) (0.28)
16 14.48 0.38 0.31 13.51 0.36 0.28 12.08 -0.14 -0.16
(0.25) (0.07) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.14) (0.61) (0.84) (1.16)
17 14.26 0.38 0.30 13.36 0.36 0.27
(0.21) (0.07) (0.03) (0.12) (0.02) (0.18)
18 14.04 0.38 0.28 13.20 0.36 0.26
(0.18) (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.02) (0.22)
19 13.82 0.38 0.26 13.05 0.36 0.24
(0.15) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.04) (0.28)
20 13.60 0.38 0.22 12.90 0.36 0.22
(0.12) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.36)
21 13.38 0.37 0.16 12.74 0.36 0.20
(0.11) (0.03) (0.19) (0.13) (0.09) (0.46)
22 13.15 0.34 0.05 12.59 0.35 0.16
(0.11) (0.03) (0.35) (0.14) (0.13) (0.61)
23 12.91 0.31 12.85 12.43 0.33 0.09
(0.13) (0.09) (0.20) (0.16) (0.19) (0.85)
24 12.67 0.16 12.58 12.27 0.30 0.00
(0.17) (0.35) (0.31) (0.17) (0.27) (1.22)
25 12.42 0.31 12.26 12.11 0.21 -0.26
(0.23) (1.01) (0.52) (0.19) (0.47) (2.45)
26 12.13 -1.45 11.84 11.95 0.16 -0.44
(0.35) (5.65) (1.02) (0.22) (0.57) (3.07)
27 11.77 4.05 11.23 11.77 -0.69 -5.22
(0.57) (20.92) (2.02) (0.26) (3.13) (39.26)
28 11.11 -39.00 9.56
(1.55) (147.37) (6.41)
Table IV: Profit and Entry Cost Estimates in Amstetten
*
Pub Restaurant
* Standard deviations are displayed in parenthesis.
Carpenter Bakery Coffeehouse